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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the rationality of proceeding with a common currency in West 
Africa by testing for symmetry and speed of adjustment to four underlying structural 
shocks among a pair of 66 ECOWAS economies. The findings reveal that there is 
relatively high degree of symmetry in the responses of the economies to external 
disturbances, while about 85 percent of the correlations in supply, demand and 
monetary shocks among the countries are asymmetric. The size of the shocks and speed 
of adjustment among countries are also dissimilar, suggesting that ECOWAS should 
not yet proceed with the eco, since the costs will outweigh the benefits.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Inspired by the success of the euro as a common currency of the European Monetary 
Union, The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) proposed to 
launch a common currency for ‘the community’ called the eco with the postponed 
inception date being June 2014. ECOWAS is a regional group of 15 West African 
countries1 which already includes a monetary union of the former French colonies 
known as West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)2. In April 2000, 
ECOWAS adopted a strategy of a two-track approach to the adoption of a common 
currency in the whole area. As a first track, the non-WAEMU members of ECOWAS 
were to form a second monetary union known as the West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ)3 by July 2005, with the second track being the subsequent merging of 
WAEMU and WAMZ to form a single currency union in the region with a common 
currency- the eco. 
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The feasibility of a wider monetary unification in ECOWAS poses several economic 
and institutional peculiarities as discussed in detail by Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008) 
and Masson and Pattillo (2005). First, it is unlikely that the French Treasury’s 
guarantee of convertibility of WAEMU’s currency (the CFA franc) to the euro at a 
fixed parity would continue for a monetary union of the expected size. Second, with 
politically dependent central banks there is an incentive for monetary policy to be used 
to extract seigniorage which creates distortions and disincentives for countries to join 
the union since they are likely to lose the seigniorage privilege. Other issues include the 
membership of the relatively gigantic Nigerian economy and the implications of its 
fiscal activities, and more recently, the implications of the global financial crises. Also, 
given the recent debt and financial crisis facing members of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU), a thorough appraisal of the feasibility of the proposed eco is desirable to 
ascertain the realizability and sustainability of the proposed union.  
The standard framework used by economist to examine the desirability of a monetary 
union is the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) theory, pioneered by Mundell (1961) and 
McKinnon (1963) and elaborated by Krugman (1990) (see De Grauwe (2005) and 
Frank and Rose (1996) for an exposition). The theory places emphases on four key 
criteria that would impinge on the benefits of adopting a common currency. They are: 
1) the degree of openness and intra-regional trade, 2) the degree of labour and factor 
mobility, 3) the symmetry of shocks across countries and 4) the system of risk sharing. 
Depending on the extent to which these conditions are met, individual countries may 
enjoy benefits or suffer losses by joining a currency union. Some of the benefits 
accruable include: lower transaction costs, price stabilization, improved efficiency of 
resource allocation, enhanced trade and increased access to factor, labour and financial 
markets, among others. Costs include loss of siegnorage privilege and the sovereignty 
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to maintain national monetary and exchange rate polices (Tsangarides and Qureshi, 
2008; Karras, 2006; De Grauwe, 2005). Technically, the costs and benefits that may 
accrue to members of a monetary union can be measured by the symmetry (positive 
correlation) or asymmetry (negative correlation) of responses to exogenous 
disturbances affecting the members and the speed with which the economies adjust 
back to equilibrium after a shock. Costs tend to be lower if the disturbances are 
symmetric and markets are flexible i.e., factor, labour and financial markets are quick 
to adjust back to equilibrium, and higher conversely.  
A few recent studies have investigated the costs and benefits of adopting a common 
currency in sub-Saharan Africa and specifically in West Africa. Most of them use a 
vector auto regressive (VAR) model to estimate the asymmetry of shocks accruing to 
different sub-regions in Africa. In different works, Bayoumi and Ostry (1997), Fielding 
and Shields (2001, 2003) and Hoffmaister et al. (1988) find a low degree of correlation 
between inflation shocks across countries and that terms of trade shocks have greater 
influences on macroeconomic fluctuations in CFA countries than in other sub-Saharan 
African countries. Focusing on the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), Huizinga and Khamfula (2004) find a low degree of symmetry in real 
exchange rate shocks across countries. For East Africa, Buigut and Valev (2005) test 
the symmetry of underlying structural shocks in the region and find that supply and 
demand shocks are generally asymmetric, although their results show that the speed and 
magnitude of adjustments to shocks is similar across the countries, they advocate 
further integration of the economies for an eventual monetary union in the future.  
Coming back to the ECOWAS region, Addison et al. (2005) apply a VAR model to 
WAMZ countries and find very low cross country correlations of terms of trade shocks 
and real exchange rate shocks. Debrun et al. (2005) use a conjectured model about the 
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fiscal-monetary policy mix in the region to assess the potential for monetary integration 
in ECOWAS. Their findings provide evidence of fiscal heterogeneity and abrogates 
Nigeria’s membership of the union as non-beneficial unless it was accompanied by 
effective containment of Nigeria’s financing needs. Benassy-Quere and Coupet (2005) 
use crisp cluster analysis to examine different monetary arrangements in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Their results again suggest that Nigeria should not form part of WAMZ, while 
the creation of the enlarged WAEMU and WAMZ zone in ECOWAS appear to be 
more economically viable without Nigeria. Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008) update the 
work of Benassy-Quere and Coupet (2005) by applying hard and soft clustering 
algorithms to examine the suitability of the proposed monetary union in West Africa. 
Their results reveal considerable dissimilarities in the economic characteristics of West 
African countries. Again, among the WAMZ countries, they particularly report a lack 
of homogeneity, with Nigeria and Ghana appearing as independent singletons.  Lastly, 
Houssa (2008) use a dynamic factor model to examine the economic costs of a 
monetary arrangement in West Africa. His findings show negative and low positive 
correlations among supply disturbances across the countries, with greater similarity in 
the demand shocks among WAEMU countries. Other papers that have examined the 
feasibility of a monetary union in West Africa include Masson and Patillo (2001), 
Ogunkola (2005) and Yehoue (2005). 
Given the studies conducted so far, this paper applies an extended method with updated 
information based on a multivariate structural VAR model to assess the feasibility and 
desirability of proceeding with a common currency union in ECOWAS. The objective 
of the study is to investigate the symmetry of shocks and speed of adjustment among 
countries to external shocks, domestic supply shocks, demand shocks and monetary 
shocks.  This study brings a different contribution to the literature in many ways. First, 
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rather than using  the conventional two variable modelling approach consisting of only 
supply and demand shocks, I use a four-variable structural autoregression model to 
capture the correlation of external shocks including the global financial crises and the 
correlation of domestic monetary shocks among the countries, which has hitherto been 
neglected in previous research. In addition, the paper also examines the extent to which 
the individual economies satisfy the other three criteria of forming an OCA i.e.: intra-
trade and openness, labour and factor mobility and fiscal/ geo-political conditions.  
The balance of the paper is as follows. Section 2 examines the economic profile of all 
the ECOWAS economies, with a view to identifying patterns and dissimilarities. 
Section 3 assesses the extent to which ECOWAS economies satisfy the conditions for 
an optimal currency area. Section 4 contains the methodology while Section 5 presents 
the results and the conclusion is contained in Section 6.   
 
2. ECONOMIC PROFILE OF WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIES 
A similar profile of economic development is crucial in facilitating integration among 
potential members of a currency union. Similarities in economic structure, social 
structures and external relations make policy synchronization easier. Table 1 presents 
the economic profile of ECOWAS economies as at 2010. The table indicates that the 
range of economic growth among the countries is wide. With Benin growing at the 
slowest rate of 3% per annum and Burkina Faso growing at the fastest rate of 9.2% per 
annum, there is likely to be some dragging-effect within a monetary union, with the 
slow growing economies dragging the fast growing ones down and vice-versa. 
However, the production structure for most of the economies seems to be similar, with 
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an influential agricultural sector contributing an average of 33.4 to GDP and a weak 
manufacturing sector contributing an average of 8.1% of GDP.  
The profile of each country’s external balances are highly variegated with Sierra Leon  
having the highest current account deficit at 16.8 percent of GDP and an external debt 
stock of 133per cent  of GNI. Burkina Faso has the highest external debt stock at 542 
percent of GDP while Nigeria has the lowest at 12.5 percent of GDP. With an average 
external debt stock of 140 percent of GNI, most West African economies have a critical 
and unsustainable debt profile. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in the region seem 
to be similar in most of the countries with an average of 13 percent. Nigeria however is 
an exception as tax revenue is less than one percent of GDP. This can be explained by 
the predominant oil-export base of its economy.  
The structure and pattern of trade in the ECOWAS economies are generally similar. For 
most of the economies, the trade to GDP ratio appear to be significant with an average 
value of 64.6 percent. Social indicators such as life expectancy (which is an indicator of 
health quality) and poverty headcount among the economies are highly congruous. 
However, the malnutrition and literacy rates in these economies are highly variegated. 
For example, literacy rate (which can be used as a crude estimator of the quality of the 
labour force) is as low as 15.1 percent of the population in Niger, while it is as high as 
60.4 percent of the population in Ghana.  
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Table 1 Economic profile of ECOWAS countries (2010) 
BEN BFA CIV GMB GHA GIN GNB MLI NER NGA SEN SLE TGO Avg 
Economic structure 
GDP growth (annual %) 3 9.2 3 5 6.2 1.9 3.5 4.5 8.8 7.9 4.2 4.9 3.4 4.9 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 
US$) 
1424 1127 1703.6 1265 1469 978.4 1064 955 653 2136 1732 742 895 1242 
Inflation, consumer prices 
(annual %) 
2.3 -0.8 1.7 5 10.7 15.5 2.5 1.1 0.8 13.7 1.3 16.6 1.8 5.6 
Agriculture, value added (% of 
GDP) 
32.2 33.3 22.9 26.9 30.2 13 57.3 36.5 39.6 32.7 16.7 49 43.5 33.4 
Manufacturing, value added (% 
of GDP) 
7.5 13.6 19.2 5 6.5 4.8 10.6 3.1 6.3 2.6 12.8 3.7 10.1 8.1 
Industry, value added (% of 
GDP) 
13.4 22.4 27.4 15.7 18.6 47.4 13.1 24.2 17.1 40.7 22.1 20.7 23.9 23.6 
Services, etc., value added (% of 
GDP) 
54.4 44.4 49.7 57.3 51.1 39.6 29.6 39.1 43.2 26.6 61.1 30.4 32.6 43 
Real effective exchange rate 
index (2005 = 100) 
n.a n.a 99.7 101.1 97.8 n.a n.a n.a n.a 118.1 n.a 99.8 98.2 102 
               
Internal and External Balances               
Current account balance (% of 
GDP) 
-8 -21 7.2 6.5 -7.2 -7.2 -3.3 -7.3 -12.1 1.3 -14.2 -16.8 -5.5 -2.7 
External debt stocks (% of GNI) 55.3 542 100 158.1 72.3 212 n.a 80.1 99.1 12.5 84.7 133 135 140 
Net ODA received (% of GNI) 10.3 13.5 10.7 18.5 6.1 5.8 17.8 11.5 9 1 8 24.3 17.7 11.9 
Broad money (% of GDP) 37.5 26.3 34 56.2 27.1 16.4 25.8 26.5 19.1 36.7 37.5 25.8 42.7 31.7 
9 
 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 16.1 12.9 16.6 18.2 12.5 11.1 n.a 14.7 11.3 0.3 16.1 11 15.4 13 
Gross national expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
114 115 95.4 119.4 113 104.4 121.4 109.4 109 n.a 119.5 112 117 113 
Trade (% of GDP) 41.9 38.3 77.2 78 63.7 74.4 81 61.8 39.3 66 68.6 46.6 103 64.6 
               
Social Indicators               
Life expectancy at birth, total 
(years) 
53.4 53.5 53.1 56.7 62.5 51.6 45.9 49.5 53.4 50.2 57.6 46.4 54.8 53 
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a 
day (PPP) (% of pop.) 
75.3 81.2 46.8 56.7 56.3 87.2 77.9 77.1 75.9 83.9 71.3 76.1 69.3 71.9 
Malnutrition prevalence (% of 
children under 5) 
20.2 37.4 16.7 15.8 13.9 22.5 17.4 27.9 39.9 26.7 14.5 28.3 22.3 23.3 
Literacy rate, adult total (% of 
people ages 15 and above) 
29 21.6 45.3 35.8 60.4 28.1 38 18.2 15.1 49.8 38.7 30.1 44.4 35 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 2011 
Note: When figures for 2010 are not available, the most recent available figures are used. 
Keys: N.A- not available, BEN-Benin, BFA- Burkina Faso, CIV- Cote d’ Ivories, GMB- The Gambia, GHA-Ghana, GIN-Guinea,  GNB- Guinea 
Bissau,  MLI- Mali,  NER-Niger,  NGA-Nigeria, SEN- Senegal,  SLE- Sierra Leon  TGO- Togo.  
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3. DO ECOWAS ECONOMIES HAVE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS TO 
FORM AN OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA? 
(a) Criterion 1: trade and openness 
The literature on optimal currency area emphasises trade as the main channel through 
which benefits from a common currency will be enjoyed. The more countries trade with 
each other, especially in a particular region, the more they will value regional exchange 
rate stability. In other words, the larger the volume of intra-regional trade, the greater 
the benefits for countries in a region to form a currency union. In this regard, currency 
unions are expected to be welfare enhancing because they reduce the potential 
disruptions to intra-regional trade brought about by relative price fluctuations and 
disturbances in bi-lateral exchange rates. Moreover, Frankel and Rose (2000) provide 
empirical evidence to show that trade has positive impacts on growth and a common 
currency encourages trade in turn.  
Table 2 depicts the trade concentration and diversification indices of ECOWAS 
economies in 2009 and 2010. The pattern of concentration and diversification among 
the countries are variegated. Togo had the lowest trade concentration index in 2009 and 
maintained the status in 2010. While Guinea-Bissau had the highest concentration 
index at 0.89 followed by Guinea at 0.61, indicating that in 2009, these economies had 
high product and trade direction concentration. The diversification index for most of the 
economies in 2010 is relatively high, with Togo having the least at 69% and Mali with 
the highest at 87%. Following the diversification criterion, one can conclude that the 
ECOWAS region would likely benefit from adopting a common currency. 
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Table 2 Trade concentration and diversification indices for ECOWAS economies 2009-
2010 
2009 2010 
Economy 
Absolute 
Value 
Concentrat
ion Index 
Diversificati
on Index 
Absolute 
Value 
Concentrat
ion Index 
Diversificati
on Index 
Benin 140 0.35 0.75 138 0.37 0.75 
Burkina Faso 93 0.52 0.81 118 0.50 0.82 
Côte d'Ivoire 166 0.36 0.71 180 0.35 0.70 
Gambia 18 0.35 0.72 23 0.32 0.69 
Ghana 222 0.46 0.83 228 0.46 0.82 
Guinea 92 0.61 0.80 92 0.44 0.81 
Guinea-Bissau 12 0.89 0.75 12 0.89 0.75 
Mali 167 0.57 0.83 137 0.63 0.87 
Niger 84 0.43 0.86 100 0.38 0.80 
Nigeria 250 0.83 0.84 185 0.77 0.80 
Senegal 195 0.24 0.72 190 0.27 0.75 
Sierra Leone 217 0.24 0.64 220 0.27 0.71 
Togo 167 0.20 0.69 165 0.21 0.69 
Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat  
 
(b) Criterion 2: labour and factor mobility 
Mundell (1961) argues that an optimal currency area is a group of countries in which 
labour and factor mobility is relatively high. If for example a member of an OCA is hit 
by negative asymmetric demand shocks, then labour and other factors of production 
will move from this country to other member countries, thereby restoring employment 
to its original level. With high labour and factor mobility, there will be movements in 
the region so as to equalize wages and factor prices from areas with excess supply to 
areas with deficit supplies. 
Labour mobility varies across ECOWAS economies; however, there is unfortunately 
scant official data on labour mobility among West African economies. While labour 
mobility is relatively high between Nigeria and Benin4, there is very little mobility 
between most of the other economies. Ghana is relatively immobile because of some 
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legal immigration and social security hurdles which are more relaxed in other 
economies.  
Table 3 Total labour force and agric labour force in ECOWAS economies 2005-2010 
(thousands) 
YEAR 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
ECONOMY SECTOR 
      Benin All sectors 3212 3334 3456 3580 3698 3825 
 
Agric  1556 1582 1607 1631 1653 1674 
Burkina Faso All sectors 6275 6488 6699 6908 7137 7366 
Agric 5677 5892 6120 6351 6589 6835 
Côte d'Ivoire All sectors 7522 7709 7911 8126 8367 8606 
Agric 3053 3052 3057 3062 3068 3074 
Gambia All sectors 681 701 722 743 765 788 
Agric 535 550 565 581 596 612 
Ghana All sectors 9851 10114 10379 10647 10944 11232 
 
Agric 5411 5516 5664 5790 5922 6058 
Guinea All sectors 4397 4500 4610 4720 4850 4988 
Agric 3606 3668 3731 3801 3879 3964 
Guinea-Bissau All sectors 605 617 631 645 660 676 
Agric 449 457 462 470 478 486 
Mali All sectors 3388 3480 3578 3672 3767 3869 
Agric 2420 2464 2511 2551 2592 2635 
Niger All sectors 4198 4326 4463 4592 4803 4973 
 
Agric 3639 3764 3895 4036 4183 4336 
Nigeria All sectors 44906 46110 47330 48613 49998 51349 
Agric 12376 12341 12312 12285 12257 12230 
Senegal All sectors 4769 4923 5078 5242 5408 5580 
Agric 3454 3541 3642 3742 3845 3952 
Sierra Leone All sectors 1952 2007 2055 2102 2141 2188 
Agric 1215 1241 1261 1281 1300 1320 
Togo All sectors 2594 2680 2772 2866 2962 3059 
 
Agric 1329 1352 1375 1399 1424 1449 
Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat  
Table 3 depicts the structure of the labour force in ECOWAS economies, showing 
clearly the thousand number of labour employed in all sectors and those employed in 
the agricultural sector between 2005 and 2010. An examination of the structure 
indicates that agriculture is the dominant employer of labour in all the economies 
accounting for between 53 and 95 percent of the employed labour in these economies. 
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As a result of the high concentration of labour in the agricultural sector (which is a 
primary sector that does not necessarily require skilled labour), one may not expect 
perfect labour and factor mobility in the near future because primary sectors are not 
skilled-labour intensive and they are not usually affected by domestic demand shocks 
rather they are affected by exogenous and mostly climatic shocks which are likely to 
cut across the region. Nevertheless, the parties to the conference (i.e. ECOWAS 
governments) would need to install institutional frameworks that will remove hurdles to 
labour mobility, something similar to what is obtainable in the Euro zone.  
 
(c) Criterion 3: fiscal transfers and geo-political factors 
At the present, no official fiscal transfer mechanisms exists in the region except for 
some form of official and military aid provided by Nigeria to some other countries in 
the region. This issue has to be addressed before the actual take-off of the common 
currency regime. While the economic criteria discussed above are essential for 
determining the suitability of a common currency regime in West Africa, the geo-
political factors play an equally important role in this process. Two developments in the 
international environment make the prospects of a successful monetary union more 
challenging and at the same time needful. First is the global financial crisis which has 
weakened the growth in the world economy, thereby adversely affecting the export 
performance of the region. Second, with the proliferation of regional economic blocs 
and growing protectionism in the developed and developing regions, West African 
countries may find it difficult to gain access to these markets. Given these trends, it will 
be beneficial for West African economies to focus on intra-regional trade. Again, this 
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may not be adequate because of the primary product based nature of most of the 
economies in the region.  
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
(a) The model 
As already mentioned, to ascertain the appropriateness of proceeding with a common 
currency in West Africa, I examine the symmetry and/or asymmetry of responses to 
macroeconomic shocks among countries in the region with a view to ascertain whether 
the ECOWAS region meets the criteria for an optimal currency area (OCA). Blanchard 
and Quah (1989) provided the empirical foundation for this examination, and their 
model has consistently been refined in subsequent studies. For examples, see Bayoumi 
(1992), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), Saxena (2005), Buigut and Valev (2005), 
Huang and Guo (2006), Houssa (2008). The Blanchard-Quah model is premised on the 
AD-AS framework in which demand shocks have no effects on output in the long-run, 
while supply shocks can influence output and the price level both in the short and long 
run. The decision whether to adopt a common currency or not is determined by the 
symmetry or asymmetry of the correlation of shocks affecting the participating 
economies.  
Following Mundell’s (1961) arguments, countries facing positively correlated 
economic shocks will be better suited for a currency union because this will allow the 
use of union-wide policies to correct distortions. However, if the underlying shocks are 
highly idiosyncratic, it would not be ideal to proceed with a common currency since the 
costs are likely to be very large and policy synchronization will be ineffective.  
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Rather than the conventional two-shock (demand and supply) model which has been 
applied to study the appropriateness of a currency union in Africa (see Alagidede et al., 
2011: Houssa, 2008; Buigut and Valev, 2005; Kose and Reizman, 2001; Huizinga and 
Khamfula, 2004), I consider a four-shock model similar to the one used by Huang and 
Guo (2006) to study the appropriateness of a common currency in East Asia. The 
shocks consist of an external (global) shock, and three domestic shocks including; 
domestic demand shock, domestic supply shock and a monetary shock. The rational for 
incorporating an external global shock into the model is to account for the primary 
export-oriented structure of West African economies. Including a monetary shock is 
important to enable us estimate how ECOWAS economies respond to changes in their 
real effective exchange rate. Such an assessment is useful for the contemplation of the 
choice of an optimal exchange rate policy for the proposed eco.  
The framework is as follows. Consider a structural moving average of a vector of 
variables , and an equal number of shocks , so that  
 =   + 	
	 +  
 + ⋯ =   



                            (1) 
In matrix form, the model can be written as  
 =                                                                                                   (2) 
Where  = [∆∗, ∆, ∆, ∆ ]′ , comprising world real GDP denoted by ∗, 
domestic real GDP denoted by , real exchange rate denoted by  and domestic price 
level denoted by   all in log difference forms.  is a 4 * 4 matrix that defines the 
impulse responses of endogenous variables to structural shocks  = [#∗, #, $ , %]′ 
consisting of external world supply shock (#∗), domestic supply shock (#), domestic 
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demand shock ($), and monetary shock (%) respectively.  It is assumed that they are 
serially uncorrelated and orthonormal, with a variance-covariance matrix normalized to 
the identity matrix. 
 
(b) The Structural decomposition 
Since we specified world real GDP, domestic real GDP, real exchange rate and 
inflation as consisting of four types of shocks, we decompose the series as follows. 
∆∗ = 		()#∗                                                                                          (3) 
∆ = 	()#∗  +  ()#  +   '()$ +     (()%           (4) 
∆ = '	()#∗  +  '()#  +   ''()$ +     '(()%           (5) 
∆  = (	()#∗  +  (()#  +   ('()$ +     ((()%           (6) 
The decomposition presented in Equations (3) to (6) is simple and intuitive. They imply 
that world GDP is exogenous to country-specific domestic shocks, while all domestic 
variables are affected by shocks to global output. To further refine the decomposition, 
we rely on underlying economic theory to make assumptions about the effects of 
domestic shocks on each of the other domestic variables.  
(i) Global real GDP is posited to be strictly exogenous. This assumption is 
plausible because all the ECOWAS economies are relatively small and open 
economies, having no significant contribution to global output. This will 
probably not have been appropriate if a country like China were to be a 
participating member. 
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(ii) Domestic real GDP is affected only by shocks in global real GDP and shocks 
from itself in the long-run. However, it is not affected by monetary shocks %  
nor demand shocks $. This restriction is in line with Balnchard’s natural rate 
hypothesis and it implies that ∑ 	 ≠ 0,   ∑  ≠ 0,  ∑ ' = 0  and 
∑ ( = 0  .  
(iii) The real effective exchange rate is assumed to be affected by shocks from the 
global economy, domestic supply shocks and domestic demand shocks, but it is 
not affected in the long-run by a monetary shock. This restriction implies that 
∑ '( = 0  .   
(iv) The domestic price level is assumed to be strictly endogenous, implying that the 
prices are affected by shocks in global GDP, domestic supply and demand 
shocks and monetary shocks too. 
The entire model can be rewritten as a system of structural equations thus 
/
0
0
0
0
0
1∆
∗
∆
∆
∆  2
3
3
3
3
3
4
=
/
0
0
0
0
0
1		() 0 0 0
	() () 0 0
'	() '() ''() 0
(	() (() ('() ((()2
3
3
3
3
3
4
   
/
0
0
0
0
0
1
#∗
#
$
%2
3
3
3
3
3
4
                      (7) 
Following Amisano and Giannini (1997) and Huang and Guo (2005) estimates from the 
structural moving average model in Eq. (1) are not directly recovered, rather they are 
obtained by estimating a reduced form VAR model for the observed variables. In the 
structural VAR model, the external variable follows an autoregressive process, while 
the three domestic variables are modelled as functions of their own lags and lags of the 
external variable. Thus: 
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∆∗ =  6 +   Γ∆
∗
8
	
+ 9	                                                                  (8) 
and  
 =  6 +   Γ

8
	
+  Ω<∆
∗
8
	
+  9                                           (9) 
Where  = [∆, ∆, ∆ ]′ , Γ and Ω< are coefficient matrixes, while 9	 and 
9 = [9, 9', 9(] are a mixture of structural innovations of reduced or observed 
residuals. Given that the first difference transformation will make the variables 
stationary, in order to obtain the relationships between reduced form innovations for the 
domestic variables and the corresponding structural stocks, we can write Eq. (9) as a 
MA representation of the form: 
 =  > +   G  9

8
	
                                                                          (10) 
Where 
> = (@ −   Γ
8
	
)
	 ( 6 +  Ω∆
∗
8
	
)                                           (11) 
The G is called impulse response and procured form: 
 GB C

C
= (@ −  Γ
8
	
)
	                                                          (12) 
Recovering structural shocks involves a special decomposition of reduced-form 
innovations, which is achieved by OLS estimation of Eq. (9). Since G9 =   and 
G = @ (an identity matrix), it follows that 9 =  . This represents a system of 16 
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equations. In accordance with the assumption that the structural shocks  =
[#∗, #, $ , %]′ are serially uncorrelated and orthonormal, we can get: Φ = E[9	 9F ] =
F  . These restrictions together with the other six restrictions imposed from 
economic theory imply that (G) is the unique Choleski lower triangle. Thus, it is 
sufficient to identify the structural  matrix and the time series of structural shocks 
 = [#∗, #, $ , %]′ by using  = 
	9. in other words, structural shocks can be 
recovered as linear combinations of reduced-form innovations. By computing the 
correlation  of the shocks in West African economies, we can evaluate the feasibility of 
a common currency union in West Africa. Positive and significant (above 50%) 
correlation coefficients signals that countries will require a synchronous policy 
response which is crucial for a centralized monetary policy management in the region.  
 
(c) The data 
I utilize annual data for 12 ECOWAS economies5, namely Benin (BEN), Burkina Faso 
(BFA), Cote d’Ivoire (CIV), Gambia (GMB), Ghana (GHA), Guinea-Bissau (GNB), 
Mali (MLI), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGA), Senegal (SEN), Sierra Leone (SLE) and 
Togo (TGO).  Liberia, Cape Verde and Guinea are excluded from the analysis. This is 
because Liberia declined to participate in the project although they are now beginning 
to indicate interest in joining, Cape Verda has a currency that is directly linked to the 
Euro and for Guinea we did not obtain sufficient data series for the analysis. The 
sample covers the period between 1970 and 2010. This time frame gives us the benefit 
of also accounting for  the effects of the 2007/08 global financial shocks (which is an 
example of an external global shock) on the domestic economies. 
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The data sets are extracted from two major sources: the International Financial 
Statistics IFS CD-ROM published by the IMF and World Development Indicators CD-
ROM published by the World Bank. Domestic output is proxied by country GDP at 
2000 constant US$. The real exchange rate series are obtained from IMF’s IFS and it is 
computed based on unit labour cost for a basket of 26 advanced countries6 and the Euro 
area as a group. All the variables are logarithimized  
 
5. THE RESULTS 
(a) Preliminaries 
Before implementing the multivariate structural VAR model, it is necessary to first scan 
the variables for integration properties. I employ the ADF-GLS test for unit root in 
which the data are detrended so that explanatory variables are taken out of the data 
prior to running the test regression. This test has the advantage of increased power 
gains associated with the detrending (Ng and Perron, 2001). The results of the unit root 
test for the natural logarithm of  global GDP, domestic GDP, real effective exchange 
rate and price level indicates that these variables for each of the countries contains unit 
roots at levels. However, after taking the first differences of these variables, they all 
became stationary although this occurred at various levels of statistical significance. 
Following the results, I conclude that all the time series used in the model are integrated 
of order one, i.e. they are I(1) stationary. 
In other to ensure that the estimates from the structural VAR are consistent, it is 
necessary to utilize the optimal lag length in the estimation. Lag order 2 is used in the 
estimation following the result of the lag order selection test using Hannan-Quinn 
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Information Criterion, and this also helps to capture the dynamics of business cycles in 
the region. 
  
(b) Correlation of structural shocks 
As already specified, I examine the pairwise correlations of disturbances affecting 
ECOWAS economies. Along this line, I concentrate on the correlations of four 
underlying structural shocks: external shocks, supply shocks, demand shocks and 
monetary shocks.  The decision criterion to assess the symmetry and asymmetry of the 
correlations of the structural shocks is as follows. If the correlation is positive, the 
shocks are categorized as symmetric or synchronous. On the other hand, if the 
correlation turns out to be negative or not statistically different from zero or less than 
0.5, the shock is categorized as asymmetric. To test for the statistical significance of the 
correlation results, I use the Kendall and Stuart (1973) correlation statistic to test 
whether the correlation is statistically significant at 5% level. The statistic (1/
2)ln [(1 + L)/(1 − L] has a distribution that approaches normality with a mean of  
(1/2)ln [(1 + M)/(1 − M] and a variance of 1/(N − 3). Where L is the estimated 
correlation coefficient, M is the null value (i.e. 0) of the correlation coefficient and N is 
the number of observations. Hence, I test the null hypothesis that the correlation 
coefficient is equal to zero, that is, (M = 0). In the following subsections, the results of 
the correlations of the four structural shocks among the ECOWAS economies for 1970 
– 2010 are reported and discussed.  
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(i) Correlation of external shocks  
Table 5 contains the correlations of external shocks to ECOWAS economies. The 
positive and statistically significant results are underlined. From the results, it is 
obvious that the correlations of external shocks are highly significant for most of the 
ECOWAS economies except for Burkina Faso, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. The likely 
reason why external shocks to most of the countries are highly correlated could be as a 
result of the similar primary product oriented export base of most of the countries. 
Ceteris paribus, the higher the correlation of shocks from an external source, the greater 
will be the benefits for countries in the region to form a currency union. This is because 
under a single currency, the potential bilateral exchange rate distortions brought about 
by external disturbances are greatly reduced, if not totally eliminated. Following this 
criterion all the other economies but Burkina Faso, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau will be 
better-off adopting a common currency.  
Table 5 Correlation of external shocks 
BEN BFA CIV GHA GMB GNB MLI NER NGA SEN SLE TGO 
BEN 1 
           BFA -0.59 1 
          CIV 0.55 0.01 1 
         GHA 0.82 -0.39 0.74 1 
        GMB -0.59 0.93 0.11 -0.2 1 
       GNB -0.15 0.78 0.35 0.22 0.88 1 
      MLI 0.95 -0.59 0.5 0.91 -0.48 -0.02 1 
     NER 0.89 -0.57 0.35 0.67 -0.58 -0.16 0.87 1 
    NGA 0.76 -0.42 0.67 0.97 -0.2 0.21 0.89 0.7 1 
   SEN 0.82 -0.12 0.86 0.9 -0.05 0.37 0.81 0.69 0.83 1 
  SLE 0.75 -0.33 0.88 0.95 -0.15 0.19 0.78 0.53 0.9 0.89 1 
 TGO 0.28 0.04 0.21 0.44 0.19 0.47 0.45 0.58 0.6 0.46 0.28 1 
Red underlined numbers denote symmetry, i.e. positive correlations at the 5% level. 
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(ii) Correlation of domestic supply shocks 
Symmetry of supply shocks are considered to be the most critical determining factor in 
forming a currency union since supply shocks are expected to have permanent effects 
and are more likely to be invariant to demand management policies (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen, 1994; Buigut and Valev, 2005). Table 6 contains the correlation 
coefficients of the identified supply shocks among ECOWAS economies.   
Table 6 Correlation of domestic supply shocks 
  BEN BFA CIV GHA GMB GNB MLI NER NGA SEN SLE TGO 
BEN 1.00 
BFA 0.84 1.00 
          CIV 0.01 -0.05 1.00 
         GHA -0.21 0.01 0.55 1.00 
        GMB -0.31 -0.52 -0.32 -0.72 1.00 
GNB -0.14 0.07 -0.49 -0.18 -0.27 1.00 
MLI 0.10 -0.36 0.02 -0.06 0.35 -0.63 1.00 
NER 0.23 0.04 0.57 0.65 -0.69 -0.13 0.31 1.00 
NGA -0.20 -0.28 -0.77 -0.47 0.67 -0.11 0.44 -0.59 1.00 
SEN -0.56 -0.63 0.24 -0.35 0.74 -0.22 -0.03 -0.48 0.07 1.00 
  SLE -0.25 -0.26 -0.55 -0.47 0.13 0.88 -0.33 -0.22 0.10 0.07 1.00 
 TGO -0.25 -0.05 0.37 0.64 -0.08 -0.68 0.16 0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.83 1.00 
Red underlined numbers denote symmetry, i.e. positive correlations at the 5% level. 
 
It is disappointing to note that out of the 66 pairs of ECOWAS economies studied 57 of 
the correlations of domestic supply shocks are not statistically significant, meaning that 
they are asymmetric and this may reflect the major differences in the core export 
commodities of these economies, which ranges widely from crude oil in Nigeria to gold 
in Ghana and cashew nuts in Guinea-Bissau. Despite the overwhelming asymmetry in 
the correlation of supply shocks in the region, eight pairs of countries still have 
symmetrical (positive and significant) supply shocks. For example, Benin and Burkina 
Faso have a high correlation coefficient of 0.84. Others include Cote d’Ivoire and 
Ghana (0.55), Ghana and Niger (0.65), Ghana and Togo (0.64), Nigeria and Gambia 
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(0.67), Gambia and Senegal (0.88) and finally, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal (0.74). This 
result implies that ECOWAS economies need different policy responses to adjust to 
supply shocks. At a given time, a group of countries in ECOWAS may need an 
expansionary monetary policy to respond to cyclical downturns while others might 
require contractionary monetary policy to respond to cyclical booms. Consequently it 
will be difficult for ECOWAS economies to operate the proposed eco if wages are rigid 
and or factor mobility is limited as we have already seen in the previous sections.  
 
(iii) Correlation of domestic demand shocks  
Table 7 presents the correlation of domestic demand shocks among ECOWAS 
economies. The correlation of domestic demand shocks and domestic supply shocks of 
ECOWAS economies are very similar in the sense that they are generally asymmetric, 
i.e. most of them are negative with a few positive and statistically significant 
correlation coefficients. Out of the 66 pairs of ECOWAS economies examined, only 
eight economies have significant symmetry in domestic demand shocks. They are: 
Benin and Cote d’Ivoire (0.58), Benin and Ghana (0.81), Benin and Senegal (0.90), 
Burkina Faso and Senegal (0.59), Cote d’Ivoire and Niger (0.87), Ghana and Gambia 
(0.56), Ghana and Senegal (0.79), and Nigeria and Mali (0.66).  My result is different 
from Houssa’s (2008) result that only finds significant symmetry in domestic demand 
shocks between Cote d’Ivore and Benin. The insight from this result is the revelation of 
the weak inter-economic relationships among ECOWAS economies.  
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Table 7 Correlation of domestic demand shocks 
  BEN BFA CIV GHA GMB GNB MLI NER NGA SEN SLE TGO 
BEN 1.00 
BFA 0.23 1.00 
          CIV 0.58 -0.62 1.00 
         GHA 0.81 0.14 0.48 1.00 
        GMB 0.23 0.24 0.06 0.56 1.00 
GNB -0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.43 -0.76 1.00 
MLI -0.14 0.48 -0.69 -0.06 -0.29 -0.03 1.00 
NER 0.32 -0.60 0.87 0.11 0.04 0.15 -0.92 1.00 
NGA -0.67 0.25 -0.81 -0.78 -0.56 0.27 0.66 -0.66 1.00 
SEN 0.90 0.59 0.19 0.79 0.40 -0.19 0.14 -0.06 -0.46 1.00 
  SLE -0.02 -0.63 0.44 0.27 -0.23 0.08 -0.03 0.15 -0.32 -0.26 1.00 
 TGO -0.75 -0.41 -0.15 -0.83 -0.51 0.56 -0.28 0.20 0.41 -0.89 0.14 1.00 
Red underlined numbers denote symmetry, i.e. positive correlations at the 5% level. 
 
(iv) Correlation of monetary shocks 
Table 8 contains the correlation of monetary shocks in ECOWAS economies. There 
seems to be less asymmetry in the correlation of monetary shocks for ECOWAS 
economies.  Again, out of the 66 pairs of ECOWAS economies considered, only 10 
pairs of economies have symmetric correlations in monetary shocks. Here, the results 
are not surprising because they intuitively follow from the asymmetric nature of 
demand shocks among the economies. I particularly observe that the symmetric 
correlation of monetary shocks among ECOWAS economies is mostly among the 
WAEMU sub-set. Whereas, countries in the WAMZ sub-set have a divergent or 
asymmetric correlation of monetary shocks. The symmetry among the WAEMU sub-
set can be explained by the already exciting monetary arrangement in that region and 
the ties between their currency and the French franc and now the Euro. Specifically, 
symmetry can be observed in monetary shocks between Benin and Sierra Leone (0.55), 
Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau (0.73), Mali (0.53) and Niger (0.51), Guinea-Bissau 
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and Senegal (0.55) and Togo (0.62), Guinea-Bissau and Niger (0.62) and Mali and 
Senegal (0.55) 
Table 8 Correlation of monetary shocks 
  BEN BFA CIV GHA GMB GNB MLI NER NGA SEN SLE TGO 
BEN 1.00 
           BFA -0.14 1.00 
          CIV 0.39 -0.86 1.00 
GHA -0.53 0.59 -0.41 1.00 
GMB -0.28 0.13 -0.37 0.19 1.00 
GNB 0.08 -0.91 0.73 -0.46 -0.14 1.00 
MLI 0.39 -0.38 0.53 -0.36 -0.92 0.47 1.00 
NER 0.16 -0.46 0.51 0.16 0.26 0.62 0.03 1.00 
    NGA 0.22 -0.12 0.39 0.43 -0.15 0.34 0.31 0.82 1.00 
   SEN 0.46 0.02 0.39 -0.13 -0.77 -0.23 0.55 -0.35 0.02 1.00 
  SLE 0.55 0.25 -0.08 0.04 0.55 -0.32 -0.51 0.31 0.18 -0.08 1.00 
TGO -0.32 -0.36 0.32 0.23 0.62 0.19 -0.59 0.48 0.11 -0.29 0.28 1.00 
Red underlined numbers denote symmetry, i.e. positive correlations at the 5% level. 
 
(c) The dynamics of the shocks: size of disturbances and speed of adjustment 
It is instructive to examine the dynamic effects of the shocks in terms of the sizes of the 
disturbances and the speed of adjustment. The size of disturbances is an important 
economic characteristic because larger disturbances translate into higher volatility of 
the endogenous variables which undermines the effectiveness of a synchronous 
monetary policy. On the other hand, if the speed with which the economies adjust to 
disturbances is slow, then the cost of fixing the exchange rate and loosing policy 
autonomy increases.  
In order to assess the size of the disturbances, I use the impulse response coefficients 
which trace out the effect of a one-unit shock in each of the four endogenous variables. 
In the case of external shocks, the impulse responses are assumed not to be different.   
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Table 9 Size of disturbances and speed of adjustment across regions 
Countries 
Supply 
disturbances 
Demand 
disturbances 
Monetary 
disturbances 
Size Speed Size Speed Size Speed 
ECOWAS 
Benin 0.029 0.006 0.392 0.057 0.117 0.020 
Burkina Faso  0.038 0.004 0.459 0.080 0.050 0.005 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.045 0.018 0.931 0.395 0.122 0.016 
Gambia 0.032 0.006 0.729 0.260 0.159 0.029 
Ghana 0.016 0.004 0.476 0.141 0.106 0.017 
Guinea-Bissau 0.081 0.051 0.824 0.255 0.272 0.070 
Mali 0.064 0.025 1.307 1.115 0.141 0.018 
Niger 0.106 0.010 1.233 0.616 0.025 0.011 
Nigeria 0.049 0.001 0.622 0.040 0.318 0.062 
Senegal 0.038 0.011 0.608 0.328 0.075 0.012 
Sierra Leone 0.076 0.015 0.209 0.098 0.338 0.066 
Togo 0.059 0.019 0.637 0.097 0.056 0.027 
       Average 0.053 0.014 0.702 0.290 0.148 0.029 
East Asia 
Australia 0.011 0.925 0.017 0.910 
Hong Kong 0.023 1.590 0.044 1.190 0.032 
Indonesia 0.013 1.239 0.071 1.335 0.050 
Japan 0.012 1.667 0.017 0.270 0.013 
 Korea 0.029 0.886 0.038 0.115 0.030 
 Malaysia 0.032 1.038 0.063 1.607 0.015 
New Zealand 0.060 0.648 0.031 0.291 
Philippines 0.089 0.587 0.081 1.475 0.040 
Singapore 0.032 1.353 0.028 1.072 
Taiwan 0.021 1.466 0.049 0.673 
Thailand 0.026 1.381 0.042 1.279 0.019 
       Average 0.032 1.162 0.044 0.929 0.026 
 
SAARC 
Bangladesh 0.008 0.741 0.028 1.195 
Bhutan 0.023 0.727 0.033 1.532 
India 0.025 0.913 0.040 1.411 
Maldives 0.036 1.053 0.047 0.512 
Nepal 0.016 0.888 0.034 1.138 
  Pakistan 0.028 0.612 0.040 0.990 
  Sri Lanka 0.023 0.847 0.038 0.968 
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Average 0.023 0.826 0.037 1.106 
Western Europe 
Austria 0.018 0.999 0.017 0.415 
  Belgium 0.028 0.668 0.028 0.508 
  Denmark 0.022 1.104 0.017 0.135 
  Finland 0.018 0.875 0.027 0.684 
France  0.034 0.243 0.014 0.101 
Germany 0.022 1.193 0.015 0.659 
Ireland 0.021 1.222 0.038 0.382 
Italy 0.030 0.427 0.036 0.380 
Netherlands 0.033 0.692 0.019 0.511 
  Noway 0.031 0.651 0.034 0.704 
  Portugal 0.061 0.426 0.026 0.367 
  Spain 0.057 0.083 0.015 0.123 
Sweden 0.030 0.261 0.012 0.419 
Switzerland 0.031 0.997 0.016 0.858 
United Kingdom 0.018 0.425 0.019 0.016 
Average  0.030 0.684 0.022 0.417 
  
       
       The Americas 
Argentina 0.033 1.141 0.438 1.126 
Bolivia 0.069 0.585 0.636 1.302 
Brazil 0.084 0.706 0.068 0.983 
Canada 0.020 1.052 0.028 0.703 
Chile 0.064 1.214 0.251 0.548 
  Colombia 0.026 0.823 0.027 0.720 
  Ecuador 0.162 0.402 0.076 0.987 
  Mexico 0.059 0.775 0.072 0.865 
Paraguay 0.094 0.459 0.064 0.719 
Peru 0.050 1.169 0.062 0.452 
United States 0.028 0.269 0.015 0.078 
Uruguay 0.049 1.014 0.074 1.227 
Venezuela 0.062 0.810 0.074 0.949 
  
       Average 0.062 0.801 0.145 0.820 
  Note: Figures for Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas is from Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1994), SAARC figures are from Saxena (2005), size of  monetary shocks for 
East Asia are from Huang and Guo (2006) and ECOWAS figures are author’s 
computations. 
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Hence, I focus on the other three structural disturbances. For supply shocks, we use the 
average absolute value of the long-run (20-year horizon) of one unit shock on changes 
in real GDP as a measure of size since the supply disturbances are expected to have 
permanent effects on output. On the other hand, since the effects on demand and 
monetary disturbances are expected to be transitory, I proxy the demand and monetary 
shock using the average absolute value of the short-run (2 year horizon) effect of one-
unit shock consumer price index and real effective exchange rate respectively7.  For 
speed of adjustment, I follow Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) by estimating the 
responses after 2 years as a share of the long run effect. To aid appreciation of the 
circumstances in ECOWAS economies, the results are compared to results that have 
been obtained in other geographical regions.  
Table 9 displays the size of disturbances and speed of adjustment for supply, demand 
and monetary shocks for different geographic regions8. Looking among the ECOWAS 
economies, I observe that Benin has the lowest size of supply shocks at 2.9 percent, 
while Niger has the highest at 10.6 percent. Demand shocks are relatively higher with 
Mali having the highest size of demand shock and the fastest speed of adjustment. For 
monetary disturbances, I observe that Sierra Leone and Nigeria have the highest rates 
of monetary disturbance at 33 and 31 percent respectively. The speed of adjustment to 
monetary shocks are generally slow with that of Nigeria showing that only about 6% of 
the adjustment is completed within the first two years.  
Comparing the average results for ECOWAS economies with the average from other 
regions, I observe that the average size of supply shocks in West Africa (0.053) is only 
second to the America’s (0.062). When put side-by-side with the results from other 
regions that have adopted or are about to adopt a common currency, for example 
Western Europe (0.03), East Asia (0.032), SAARC (0.023), the average size of the 
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supply shocks in ECOWAS economies is comparatively too large, raising the red light 
on the proposed Eco! A similar pattern is also observed for demand hocks. Also, the 
large size of monetary shock and slow speed of adjustment to monetary disturbances 
for ECOWAS economies is an indication that a one-size-fits-all exchange rate policy 
across the region will not be ideal. A currency union in West Africa can only be 
effective if the size of monetary disturbances are low, and the speed of adjustments are 
high, and this does not seem to be the case.   
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have committed myself to asking and answering the question ‘should 
West Africa proceed with a monetary union? A multivariate structural VAR model is 
used to examine the symmetry of four kinds of disturbances affecting the region. They 
include external shocks, supply shocks, demand shocks and monetary shocks. The 
results indicate that there is a relatively high degree of symmetry in the correlation of 
external shocks to countries in the region. The pattern of supply, demand and monetary 
shocks among the countries in the region is highly asymmetric, implying that it will be 
difficult for ECOWAS to operate the eco because the presence of asymmetric shocks 
indicates the need for different policy responses to adjust to supply, demand and 
monetary shocks in the region. In addition, the results reveal differing sizes and speeds 
of adjustment in monetary shocks. The implication is that the responses to real 
exchange rate shocks in the region do not converge, and therefore it will not be ideal to 
adopt a one-size-fits all exchange rate policy across the region.  
In this light, policy makers in West Africa should consider delaying the introduction of 
the proposed eco and work further towards stronger integration of the ECOWAS 
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economies in terms of intra-regional trade and factor and labour mobility within the 
region. Delaying the take off of the proposed eco will also afford policy makers the 
opportunity to learn from the prevailing debt and financial crisis being experienced in 
the Euro zone  with a view to build in pre-emptive strategies.  
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NOTES 
1
 The list includes: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.  
2
 Members of WAEMU include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal and Togo.  
3
 WAMZ countries include The Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone  
4
 This can partly be explained by the porous borders between the two counties and their 
relative proximity. 
5
 Liberia, Cape Verde and Guinea are excluded from the analysis. This is because Liberia 
declined to participate in the project although there are now beginning to indicate 
interest, Cape Verda has a currency that is directly linked to the Euro and for Guinea 
we did not obtain sufficient data series for the analysis.  
6
 These 26 advanced economies include: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. 
 
7
 The approach we adopted is similar to the approach adopted by Huang and Guo (2006) and 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). The advantage of this approach is that it enables us 
to compare results across regions and times.  
8
 Figures for Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas is from Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1994), SAARC figures are from Saxena (2005), size of  monetary shocks for East Asia 
are from Huang and Guo (2006) and ECOWAS figures are author’s computations. 
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